



CARIM INDIA – DEVELOPING A KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR POLICYMAKING ON INDIA-EU MIGRATION

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An Overview of Highly-Skilled Labour Migration to Norway – with a Focus on India as Country of Origin

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Helge Hiram Jense**

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CARIM-India
Developing a knowledge base for policymaking on India-EU migration

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**An Overview of Highly-Skilled Labour Migration
to Norway – with a Focus on India as Country of Origin**

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CARIM-India – Developing a knowledge base for policymaking on India-EU migration

This project is co-financed by the European Union and carried out by the EUI in partnership with the Indian Council of Overseas Employment, (ICOE), the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore Association, (IIMB), and Maastricht University (Faculty of Law).

The proposed action is aimed at consolidating a constructive dialogue between the EU and India on migration covering all migration-related aspects. The objectives of the proposed action are aimed at:

- Assembling high-level Indian-EU expertise in major disciplines that deal with migration (demography, economics, law, sociology and politics) with a view to building up migration studies in India. This is an inherently international exercise in which experts will use standardised concepts and instruments that allow for aggregation and comparison. These experts will belong to all major disciplines that deal with migration, ranging from demography to law and from economics to sociology and political science.
- Providing the Government of India as well as the European Union, its Member States, the academia and civil society, with:
 1. Reliable, updated and comparative information on migration
 2. In-depth analyses on India-EU highly-skilled and circular migration, but also on low-skilled and irregular migration.
- Making research serve action by connecting experts with both policy-makers and the wider public through respectively policy-oriented research, training courses, and outreach programmes.

These three objectives will be pursued with a view to developing a knowledge base addressed to policy-makers and migration stakeholders in both the EU and India.

Results of the above activities are made available for public consultation through the website of the project: <http://www.india-eu-migration.eu/>

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Summary

The paper aims at providing an overview of skilled labour migration to Norway, specifically focussing on highly-skilled labour migrants from India. The first part presents relevant migration policies in Norway: their history, their general characteristics, and some features of specific relevance for highly-skilled labour migrants from India. It ends with a critical assessment of an on-going policy process. The second part of the report presents some relevant data from official data registers, in five tables and one figure. This second part concludes with a critical appraisal of the data. Parts 1 and 2 are supposed to provide complimentary information, analyses and interpretations. The introduction to part 1 refers to the introduction to part 2 and vice versa. The tables in part 2 are chosen to present empirical realities of relevance to the policies presented in part 1. The critical discussion at the end of part 2 addresses the epistemological side of the policy discussion at the end of part 1. Each of two parts progress from more objective facts to more evaluative assessments.

1.0.0 Policy Framework for highly-skilled labour migrants

In Norway, the migration of highly-skilled migrants from India is not central matter of great importance either in public or policy debates. As we show in part 2 of this report, there has been a significant increase in the migration of highly-skilled migrants from India to Norway. This fact is seldom reflected in Norwegian public debate or policymaking, simply because the debate is centred on issues that are being publically defined as ‘problematic’.

Regarding the *particular issue* of highly-skilled migrants (which is relatively uncontroversial), the facilitation of such migration is a declared policy goal of the two largest political parties (Norwegian Labour Party 2013, Norwegian Conservative Party 2013). The main argument is that the import of competence contributes to national economic growth. During 2012 there was a 12% increase in the import of skilled labour, within which the largest group were IT-professionals. Demand for competence was mainly within the oil and gas sector (UDI 2012b). The supply of skilled labour migrants came mainly from *within* the Nordic and EU/EEA/Schengen areas (ibidem). From *outside* those two regions, the number one country of origin was *India*.

Regarding the *general policy* of migration, most of the debate in Norway revolves around the question of how to preserve and develop the Norwegian welfare state model in an age of increased globalization (Norwegian Official Reports 2011:9-23). This concern tends to characterize general policy deliberation as well as specific policymaking. There is much controversy about potential social segregation and how to ensure social integration. The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (2008) is worried about potential decrease in wage levels, ‘social dumping’. As a consequence of the Norwegian state tradition, policies towards the import of skilled labour tends to adapt a relatively protectionist approach. This is certainly the case compared to states such as the USA, that have more market-oriented political tradition (Norwegian Official Reports 2011:287).

1.1.0 The Norwegian migration regulation regime

Historically, migration flows to and from the country have been shaped by economic transformations and deliberate policies. During the 1800s, a period of population growth, about half of Norway’s population migrated to America. During the 1900s, incoming migration gradually became a policy issue. From 1957 until 1971, the regulation of ingoing migration was fairly liberal. From 1975, an ‘immigration halt’ was introduced (Cappelen, Ouren and Skjerpen 2011). Still, political refugees were to be granted asylum according to UN-defined quotas, in accordance with international agreements. The rules for family establishment were important for those who had arrived as refugees after 1974, or as labour migrants before that date, because spouses could be sought in the country of origin. Additionally, internal migration within the Nordic region was facilitated by political integration between the Nordic states. Further changes took place after 2000. According to econometric analyses from Statistics Norway (ibidem), integration into the EU’s European Economic Area (EEA) in 1994 did *not* cause much change. What *did* seem to increase the influx of labour migration was the Schengen agreement in 2001, combined with the enlargement of the EU in 2007. At the same time, tightened rules for family establishment from 2008 led to significantly fewer migrants(ibidem).

This specific history has produced a migration regulation regime where incoming migration is classified into three areas of origin: (1) the Nordic states; (2) the EEA (including the EU, the Schengen-area and Switzerland); and (3) countries outside of the EEA. The first category is subject to the most liberal regulation, whereas the last category is subject to the most restrictions. Those categories frame the debate in some central policy documents that we have studied for the purpose of this report (Norwegian Official Reports 2011, Cappelen, Ouren and Skjerpen 2011, Norwegian Ministry of Labour 2008, Norwegian Ministry of Labour 2013).

(Re. 1) Migration within the Nordic region is extensive and uncontroversial. Those states are linguistically close and politically similar.

(Re. 2) From within the EEA region, an increase in migration following EU enlargement has led to much debate regarding labour migration, especially from this particular region. The conjuncture, combined with the relatively protectionist tradition of the Norwegian welfare state, conditions Norwegian policy deliberation and policymaking regarding labour migration. Regarding migration from India, it is a question for causal analysis whether the increased flux of skilled labour migrants within the EEA decreases the demand for skilled labour migrants from India. The data presented in part 2 do not show any decrease in migration from India following the increase in migration from the EEA. This might indicate that there is no such causal relationship (tables 1 and 2).

(Re. 3) Regarding migration from countries outside the EEA region, the practice of family establishment among former refugees and former labour migrants is much debated at present. Norway is presently seeing the creation of a conservative government (Consortium of Cooperation 2013). We will return to this issue at the end of part 1. With regard to migration from India, an empirical and theoretical question is whether upcoming changes in family establishment policy might have any negative consequences for *de facto* labour migration from India. We will briefly return to the question towards the end of part 1, but to address that question thoroughly would demand data that we have not obtained, and definitional discussions beyond the limits set for this report.

Thus, we have registered debate on labour migration from within the EEA, and the debate regarding family migration involving spouses from outside the EEA. However, we have not found much debate about skilled migration from outside the EEA region. Migration policy in general is a contentious field in Norway. With regard to highly-qualified migrants from India, the increased reception of such migrants to Norway appears to be welcomed (or ignored) in local policy deliberation.

1.1.1 Eligibility for permanent residence under the policy

In order to be granted a permanent residence permit in Norway, one must have stayed in Norway for 'continuously' for three years. 'Continuously' means that one should not have gaps for more than three months between different permits. In addition, one may not have stayed outside of Norway for more than 15 months. For permits of other types than 'specialist' or 'skilled worker', the period is 7 months. (See 1.1.7 regarding definition of 'specialist' and 'skilled worker'.) In addition, there is a requirement of having completed at least 250 hours of training in Norwegian or Sámi, and 50 hours of civic education. Labour immigrants are expected to cover the cost of these courses themselves (UDI 2012e). The requirements for permanent residence are likely to change in the near future. The recently elected right-wing government announced in September 2013 that they aim to tighten the rules and to increase the requirement from three to five years during the 2013-2017 parliamentary session (Consortium of Cooperation 2013).

1.1.2 Family reunification under the policy

Under the current framework, it is possible for skilled workers and specialists to bring about a family reunification with several types of relatives (UDI 2012c). Reunification is possible with a spouse. Marriages that are entered into outside Norway are generally recognized, though there are some restrictions: none of the spouses can be under 18 years of age at the time of marriage; and both must have been physically present at the time of the wedding. Unmarried partners who are cohabiters are also eligible, as long as both are unmarried and as long as they have been living together for at least two years. It is also possible for a fiancé to be given a permit to stay in Norway up to six months, with the objective of getting married during this time. After the wedding, one may apply for family reunification. Children can be granted a residence permit. Either, both parents must have a residence

permit in Norway, or if the child is going to live with one parent, that parent needs to have the sole parental responsibility, or the other parent must have agreed to let the child move to Norway. In addition, there are strict regulations regarding financial support. Economic conditions usually have to be fulfilled by the person living in Norway who is seeking family reunification – the sponsor. He or she must demonstrate both income for the coming year, and income for the previous year. The income requirement is set at 88% of state salary grade 19, which is subject to change after salary negotiation every year. In 2013, this equalled a yearly salary of 246,136 NOK (approximately 30,000 EUR) before tax. The family members residence permit will never be valid for longer than that of the sponsor, and it will only form the basis of a permanent residence permit if the residence permit of the sponsor does this. The requirements for family reunification are also likely to become more restrictive in the 2013-2017 parliamentary period as the recently elected right-wing government has announced the aim of both increasing the amount of funds required by the sponsor, and of making a minimum age of 24 years for family reunification on the basis of marriage (Consortium of Cooperation 2013). The details of this policy, however, remains to be seen.

1.1.3 Comparison with the EU Blue Card directive

Norway has not implemented the EU-blue card directive, nor is there any plans to implement the directive in the near future. The EU-blue card directive has several goals (EU Council 2009). One is to harmonize the entry and residence requirements for EU countries. This requires skilled immigrants in regulated professions to document their qualifications. As mentioned above, this is already policy in Norway. The EU Blue Card directive also gives strict income requirements for the job given to work migrants, between 1.2 and 1.5 the average salary in the respective member states. As in Norway, income requirements are made to counter the possibility of ‘social dumping’ by making it impossible for employers to give immigrants a lower salary than local employees. Norway has already implemented income requirements. However, the required level in Norway is at a lower level than in the EU, the employer not being required to pay more than the average. This may partly be attributed to a greater need for work immigrants in Norway, as the domestic labour market has not been sufficient to fill all vacancies. The higher average salary in Norway may also be a factor here. Another aim of the Blue Card directive is to increase the rights of the holder in the member states. One part of this includes freedom of travel through other member states. As Norway is already part of the Schengen area, there is no passport checking for travellers from other countries in the Schengen area. Hence, when a visa is issued, it usually gives the holder right to travel in all Schengen countries. This applies to work migrants in Norway seeking to travel to other Schengen countries, and for work migrants in other Schengen countries that wish to travel through Norway. The blue card directive also gives holders the right to freely move to another EU-country and to apply for work after 18 months. Norway, having not signed the Blue Card directive, does not give any preferential treatment to Blue Card holders for the process of finding work or gaining a residence permit in Norway. The directive also obliges member states to give equal treatment to work migrants in relation to social security, pensions, recognition of diplomas, and education. This has largely been implemented. The Norwegian welfare state is, to a great extent, based on the principle of so-called ‘universality’. We mean by this that everyone with a legal residence permit enjoys the same rights and responsibilities in relation to welfare benefits (Norwegian Official Reports 2011). An exception is the lack of recognition given to foreign educational credentials, especially diplomas from countries outside the EU/EEA area. Liebig (2009) point to a possible undervaluing or non-recognition of migrants’ earlier education. The process of gaining formal accreditation for professional education, for example in health-related professions, may also prove slow.

1.1.4 Minimum salary requirements under the policy

The pay and working conditions for migrant workers must not be worse than average in Norway (UDI 2013b). Many salaries and work condition rules in the country are settled through negotiations between organized capital and labour. If the labour migrant is to work in an industry where such a collective agreement exists, the migrant must be paid the rate agreed upon in the agreement. If the migrant is to work in an industry without an agreement, the pay cannot be poorer than what is normal for someone in the given occupation in the place the migrant is working. Such policies have been established to meet demands from the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions (2008), which is cautious about the possibility that the national standards for wage might be undermined by competition from a cheaper foreign labour force, so-called ‘social dumping’. If the work position requires a master’s degree, payment cannot be less than salary grade 47 in the pay scale for state employees. This scale is adjusted annually, as the result of salary negotiations between the unions and the state. In 2013, it equals 401,200 NOK, or approximately 49,082 EUR, yearly salary before tax.

1.1.5 No jobs subject to a labour market test

There are no labour market tests for jobs given to skilled work migrants.

1.1.6 No age restrictions under the policy

The policy documents surveyed do not say anything about any specific age restrictions for skilled migration.

1.1.7 Definition of ‘highly-skilled’ under the policy

The policy defines ‘skilled worker or specialist’ (*faglært arbeider eller spesialist*) in three categories (UDI 2013b).

- a. Completed vocational training at upper secondary school level, at least three years, e.g. as a carpenter or health worker. There must be a corresponding vocational training programme in Norway.
- b. Completed education or a degree from a university/university college, e.g. a bachelors degree as an engineer or a nurse.
- c. Special qualifications obtained through long work experience, if relevant in combination with courses, *et cetera*.

Furthermore, the policy describes ‘ethnic cooks’ [sic] as a distinct category, subject to the strict requirements for receiving a residence permit, and permits are only granted in exceptional cases (UDI 2012d). However, if one is to work as a cook and not prepare ‘ethnic’ food, one may apply for residence permit within the framework of being a skilled worker.

1.1.8 Provisions for linguistic training under the policy

Skilled workers from countries outside the EU/EEA are required to undertake linguistic training. Those must themselves cover the costs of the courses. The OECD has criticized the quality of this language-training program (Liebig 2009). However, we have not had the capacity to inquire into this issue further.

1.1.9 Special clauses for academic researchers under the policy

Academic researchers can be granted a residence permit in Norway to carry out research with their own funds. To be granted this permit they need to have an affiliation to a Norwegian research

institution with the objective of carrying out research during their stay, and they need to have sufficient funds for the duration of their stay. In 2013, the required amount is 9,250 NOK (approximately 1,140 EUR) *per* month (UDI 2013a).

1.1.10 Recruitment of health care professionals under the policy

All health personnel must first have an authorization or licence from the Norwegian Registration Authority for Health Personnel (SAK), and this authorization must be enclosed with the application for residence permits. The processing times for receiving an authorization from SAK depend on the country of education (SAK 2013a).

- a. If the applicant has an education from one of the Nordic countries, the processing time is six weeks.
- b. With education from the EU/EEA, it is three to four months.
- c. With education from outside the EU/EEA area, the procedure is more complex and depends on the type of health work. For most professions (psychologists, nurses and health care workers) it is six months. Medical doctors from outside the EU/EEA area first need to have their education credentials certified, before they can have their case processed by SAK (SAK 2013b). SAK has entered into collaboration with US Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG). This means that the candidate must submit an application to ECFMG at the same time as he or she applies to SAK. The verification process at ECFMG itself take 4-6 months, then the case will be processed at SAK for an additional six months. For dental practitioners the processing may take longer than six months, but SAK is working to reduce the waiting time.

Medical doctors are also required to complete a special adapted technical language course, as well as ordinary written and spoken Norwegian. The course is organized regularly at the University of Oslo. (See also 1.1.14 regarding the certification of education from outside the EEA area.) There are no similar rules for other types of health professionals, though employers are free to ask about such requirements (source: telephone conversation with SAK, 20.11.2013).

1.1.11 No special agreements between Norway and India

Norway has not signed an MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) with India, nor has it signed a bilateral agreement with India for the recruitment of health professionals.

1.1.12 Labour rights of spouses or partners under the policy

All family members of the migrant, including partners over 18 years of age, are granted a work permit and are entitled to work (UDI 2012f). Furthermore, the integration of women in general and migrant women in particular in the labour market is flagged as a goal across the political spectrum. Several state level policies encourage the participation of women in the work force. Both state and unions have worked for an equal pay for men and women across professions. Also, women have the right to one-year maternity leave while at the same time getting compensation for 80% of her salary. There is also an extensive offer of subsidised kindergartens, aimed at making it easier for both men and women to combine work and take up the role as a mother or father.

1.1.13 Policy on intra-company employee transfers

The policy documents surveyed do not say anything specific on intra-company employee transfers. We have not had the capacity to look into the issue further.

1.1.14 Other relevant information

A clause allows for newly-educated professionals or researchers to apply for a permit to get a visa for a period of job searching. To be eligible for this, the subject has to fulfil a number of criteria: the purpose of the stay must be to apply for skilled work in Norway. He or she must be considered a 'skilled' worker.

The OECD criticizes Norwegian migration regulation regime for not approving education from foreign countries, especially those outside the EEA area (Liebig 2009). The processing of applications is also criticized for taking too long, leading to unnecessary difficulties for highly-skilled migrants from outside the EEA region. The critique does not only apply to education in the health professions.

1.2.0 On-going policy reforms

Policy changes before 2008 were briefly reviewed in the introduction to part 1. We will now briefly visit policy changes that were in the pipeline at the moment when this was written.

Deliberations over Norwegian migration policy gained renewed actuality after a the establishment of a coalition led by the Conservative party won the parliamentary election in 2013. Migration policy was contentious among the parties within the coalition: on the one hand the Progress Party, on the other hand the Christian People's Party and the social liberal Left Party. The first argues that incoming migration might bring criminality, or threaten the historically established national culture. The last block, by contrast, mobilizes humanitarian arguments, and is in favour of a general liberalization. Between those two forces, the 'law and order' block and the 'humanitarian' block, the leading Conservative Party (2013) has been a proponent of increased migration of highly-skilled migrants. The latter issue is our concern here.

30 September, the four parties signed a Consortium of Cooperation (2013), or *Samarbeidsavtale*. Here they try to sort out their various stances to migration policy, under a shared allegiance to the welfare state. According to the leader of the Norwegian Organization for Asylum seekers (Austenå 2013), the agreement was less of a systematic sorting of political issues than a 'jumble sale' (*garasjesalg*) of diverse political offers.

Regarding *highly-qualified labour migrants*; the agreement explicitly states the intention of attracting these kinds of competences.

However, a *different form of labour migration* is addressed with the stated aim to strengthen Schengen control mechanisms against 'groundless asylum seekers'. Thus, on the one hand, highly-skilled labour migrants from India and other non-EEA states will be more warmly welcome than before, while on the other hand, their less-skilled or unskilled compatriots appear to be increasingly labelled as a social problem. For social and political theory, there might be reason to discuss the concept of 'groundless' asylum seekers. The term implies that political refugees and labour migrants are mutually exclusive categories, excluding persons that might potentially have been defined as economic refugees or climate refugees. There is virtually no public deliberation in Norway questioning the concept of 'groundless' asylum seekers. Instead, the present debate on asylum seekers revolves around children's basic human rights (NOAS 2013). The main public controversy around the Consortium of Cooperation concerned persons seeking asylum claiming status as political refugee, especially those below 18 years of age, an issue actualizing the cleavages among the coalition parties. While this issue is the most central one in public debate, the most relevant for present purposes is the suggested policies for the liberalization of labour migration.

While the debate on highly-skilled labour migration is directly relevant for our research question, and the controversy about under age asylum seekers has only indirect relevance, a third issue is more ambiguous in this regard: *the rules for family establishment*. When we suggest that those might be relevant for labour migration, we do *not imply* that marriage is somehow 'inauthentic' if economic

interest is involved; *on the contrary* we hold the view that the family is always an economic fellowship. Family businesses owned by transnational families can be seen as a contribution to economic growth in the small businesses sector, the urban undergrowth (Jensen 2008). Rules for transnational family establishment are another issue of disagreement between the parties of the new governmental coalition. Stricter measures are being proposed: stricter demands to sponsor a potential spouse; a minimum age of 24 years for the aspiring spouse; demand of more years of residency before citizenship can be claimed; and demands for DNA-testing for children. Some of those measures are explained by the need to protect young persons against forced marriages, an issue that has been debated within the Pakistani community in Norway (Karim 1996). There is also the question of the rules regarding spouses who experience domestic violence, an issue that has been discussed in relation to migrant brides of native Norwegian men (Sverdljuk 2010). Whether the suggested policies are functional is another question. Concern for domestic violence motivates all those parties, who all share a commitment to political liberalism. However, we would also suggest the hypothesis of an additional motivation. In our view, the rules for family formation is the only policy area where the right-populist Progress Party may enjoy actual political opportunities to further its anti-immigration program. This is because most of Norwegian migration policy is bound by international agreements: the obligation to receive political refugees is a UN norm; while participation in a shared labour market is an EU rule. Thus, the only form of migration to be regulated freely by the Norwegian parliament is family migration. In the last decades, family establishment has been the main cause of incoming migration from outside the EEA area. Therefore, there is good reason to expect that freedom from forced marriage and domestic violence is not the only motivation to impose strict measures like the ones mentioned above. Changes in the rules for transnational family establishment has consequences for those transnational families that do family business. In this regard, such policy changes will have consequences for a specific category of migration where the ideal type of marriage migration overlaps with the ideal type of labour migration. Whether this problematic is of relevance to transnational families based in Norway and India is an empirical question, which we do not have the data to answer. In Norway, there are a considerable number of families with Asiatic roots who do transnational family business, for example amongst the Pakistani-Norwegian community, but we have no relevant data on Indian-Norwegians.

In sum, the emerging policies of the Conservative coalition government appear to influence Indian labour migrants thus.

1. *Firstly*, the policies appear to *facilitate* the reception of an increased number of highly-skilled labour migrants from India and other non-EEA states.
2. *Secondly*, it proposes *stricter* control of ‘groundless’ asylum seekers from outside the EEA, including India. But it is unclear how the government plans to influence EU policies.
3. *Thirdly*, it proposes that the Norwegian parliament enacts *limitations* on the rules for transnational family establishment. This will have consequences for transnational family business, including Indian-Norwegian family firms.

Thus, it is clear that the proposed policy changes would favour *highly-skilled labour migrants*, from India and other countries, while they would have a more ambiguous effect on the opportunities for *other labour migrants*, from India or other places. Our evaluation is that stricter limitations on transnational family establishment would potentially hamper the opportunities for transnational families and family businesses. That would favour the immigration policy of the Progress Party, while the effect would be contrary to the economic policies of the three other parties in the coalition.

The formation of a new Conservative coalition government actualizes policy deliberation in a particular way. Over the long run, we might expect social democratic ideology to play a more significant role. It might make sense to distinguish between two discursive formations co-determining Norwegian policies towards incoming labour migrants, from within the EEA or from outside of it, highly-skilled or otherwise. *On the one hand*, the two largest parties in the country agree that there is a need to import highly-skilled labour, in order to contribute to national economic growth (Norwegian

Labour Party 2013, Norwegian Conservative Party 2013). A complimentary argument is the concern for mutual ‘comparative advantages’ in the exchange between the countries of origin and of reception (Norwegian Conservative Party 2013). *On the other hand*, the trade union argument about national ‘social dumping’ will probably climb up the policy agenda, together with the complimentary concern for ‘brain drain’ in countries of origin (Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions 2008). Thus, both those discursive formations include national as well as cosmopolitan arguments. Both discursive formations are likely to affect policy deliberation, policymaking, and thus, will shape the opportunities which highly-skilled migrants from India find in Norway.

2.0.0 Labour migration statistics: skilled labour migrants

As mentioned in the introduction to part 1, India is the main country of origin among registered labour migrants from *outside* the EEA area (UDI 2012b); while this migration is outnumbered by labour migration from *within* the EEA (UDI 2012a).

2.1.0 Overview of the data

Migration from India constitutes a small portion of the total migration to Norway, in spite of a stable increase of migration from India to Norway since 2000 (see table 2). This growth corresponds not only to a general increase in migration from Asian countries, but also to an abrupt increase in migration from within the EEA area after 2004 (see tables 1 and 2).

Focussing on migrants from India to Norway (Table 5), we see stable growth through time since 2000, as well as a slight increase in the male part of Indian migration, from 52% to 55%. As with most other countries of origin, the increase in total migration from India coincides with an increase in family migration (table 3).

Regarding the total incoming migration to Norway, figure 1 indicates general growth since 2004. The figure also indicates that the two main components include the abrupt increase in incoming labour migration and a steady increase in family migration. (Regarding labour migration, tables 1 and 2 show that most of the influx originates from the EEA area, but also some from Asia, including India). At the end of part 2 we will return to those two fluxes of incoming migration. There we address the integration of those fluxes into the domestic labour force, a question frequently posed in Norwegian migration policy debate. At the end we will also briefly discuss the mutual interdependency between public policy making and official register data.

2.1.0 Data: tables and figure

All the following tables are taken from official register data, mostly from the internet databases of Statistics Norway (2013b) and the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI 2013). Those sources are publicly accessible, though they may not be user friendly for the lay audience.

Table 1. Net migration to Norway from parts of the world, 2000-2012

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
EU/EEA countries	-1302	-216	1370	-147	2871	7054	13367
Non EU/EEA european countries	1172	492	2153	2302	2588	2343	1803
Africa	2587	2499	3827	3470	3118	3240	3078
Asia including Turkey	8383	6749	9543	7366	6760	7339	6797
North America	-326	13	555	360	420	408	530
South and Central America	815	742	913	839	789	833	854
Oceania	-5	38	78	88	117	45	167

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
EU/EEA countries	13367	26258	29141	25110	32043	33981	31168
Non EU/EEA european countries	1803	2437	2319	1824	1734	2177	2552
Africa	3078	3725	3535	4626	5030	5144	7462
Asia including Turkey	6797	8690	9922	10643	9607	9620	10826
North America	530	689	922	850	592	585	825
South and Central America	854	1132	1086	1044	877	1090	1024
Oceania	167	190	146	199	169	168	156

Source: Statistics Norway (SSB), register data.

This table is based on register data from Statistics Norway (SSB). We see that EU and EEA countries make up the largest share of net migration to Norway, with a sharp increase since 2004. Asia and Turkey also represents a substantial share and fluctuate while increasing from 8,383 in 2000 to 10,826 in 2012. However, the increase is less dramatic than that of the EU and EEA countries.

Migration from Africa, on the other hand, sees a sharp increase with almost a three-fold increase from 2,587 in 2000 to 7,462 in 2012. South and North America and Oceania have a relatively minor share of migration to Norway.

Table 2. Total net migration to Norway, selected countries 2000-2012.

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Poland	289	483	702	586	1576	3271	7401	14073	14309	10323	11197	12615	11339
Lithuania	137	216	289	265	523	783	1339	2356	2854	3163	6482	7629	6516
Russia	895	961	1350	1835	1724	1398	1083	1442	1153	962	878	966	998
Germany	1371	1415	1572	1530	1653	2101	2581	4168	4580	3039	2808	2510	1905
Eritrea	41	72	81	79	104	332	290	402	740	1520	1715	1564	1669
Somalia	1424	1009	1927	1578	1068	903	1011	1348	910	1069	1434	1457	2933
Afghanistan	369	628	869	1188	654	714	504	478	658	1195	1254	867	848
Philippines	464	542	660	653	643	832	986	1360	1471	1364	1704	2114	2100
India	259	372	354	298	298	347	552	960	1121	745	803	1161	1411
Iraq	4382	1049	2467	934	919	1159	820	921	1134	1231	891	675	427
Pakistan	772	862	937	800	719	755	663	785	809	827	706	690	893
Thailand	561	679	1023	986	1220	1353	1377	1568	1439	1604	1379	1418	1468
USA	1708	1717	1852	1590	1405	1504	1522	1561	1718	1665	1684	1744	1852
Total	9 688	7 955	17 174	11 285	13 211	18 439	23 723	39 652	43 346	38 637	42 346	47 032	47 343

Source: Statistics Norway (SSB), register data.

The table shows the total net migration to Norway, from selected countries. In addition to work migration, this also includes residence permits granted on refugee and humanitarian grounds, and for family reunion. This is register data gathered by UDI (Norwegian Directorate of Immigration), who are also the processing agency for applications on residence permits to Norway. The selection of countries highlights several trends:

- The increase seen in Poland and Lithuania are illustrative of a sharp increase in migration from several eastern membership states of the European Union since 2004.
- Some countries (e.g. the USA, Thailand and Pakistan), show a high degree of stability in net migration.
- Waves of refugee migration are visible from war-torn countries in periods of conflicts, such as Afghanistan, Eritrea, and Russia.

Migration from *India* shows a stable increase throughout the period, from 259 in 2000 to 1,411 in 2012.

Table 3 Family migration to Norway, selected countries, 2002-2012.

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012*
Poland	289	247	390	748	1702	3292	4423	2773	4612	4376	NA
Lithuania	136	106	162	238	382	643	749	655	2132	2356	NA
Somalia	1707	652	689	929	913	1003	1179	1027	685	1331	1210
Thailand	918	780	1099	1014	943	1073	1214	1248	989	1176	1227
Germany	426	401	563	558	768	1456	1630	835	1140	1166	NA
Phillipines	457	396	437	433	412	618	580	703	766	975	1007
Eritrea	46	26	42	34	49	78	142	237	430	869	728
Russia	905	797	742	653	595	658	607	620	506	610	627
Iraq	1737	940	909	933	626	436	654	762	554	554	271
India	161	132	162	176	246	496	478	431	361	533	641
USA	439	322	423	355	410	453	528	459	410	465	NA
Pakistan	545	518	496	461	392	431	438	500	344	412	492
Afghanistan	510	387	318	507	471	362	445	391	358	382	337
Stateless	135	94	109	88	131	205	534	539	317	242	146
Total**	14607	10469	12750	13035	13981	17913	20766	18112	21526	24577	NA
*Only numbers for non-eu countries were available for 2012.											
** Total family migration for all countries to Norway											

Sources: Norwegian Ministry of Labour 2013, UDI statistics 2013 (register data).

This table shows family migration, from selected countries. The statistics have been gathered by UDI and are based on register data.

We see that the rise in migration in the last decade, are typically followed by a parallel increase in family migration.

This is also the case with *India*: the growth of family migration follows the growth of net migration closely.

Table 4: Employment rates by migration category in Norway (arrival 2002), one year and three years after arrival.

	One year	Three year
Work	76 %	82 %
Family	36 %	46 %
Humanitarian	28 %	43 %
Total	40 %	54 %

Source: Liebig 2009:37.

This table is based on register data from Statistics Norway (SSB), and includes data from all types of migration from all countries.

The participation/integration of labour migrants in the national labour force appears to be at a very high level: 82% three years after arrival.

It is also notable that a substantial percentage of family migrants succeed in entering the labour market, with a 46% employment rate three years after arrival.

Table 5. Total migrant population in Norway with Indian origin and by gender, absolute numbers and percentage, 2000-2013.


Year	Men	Women	Total	% Men	% Women
2000	2100	1939	4039	52,0 %	48,0 %
2001	2134	1969	4103	52,0 %	48,0 %
2002	2211	2055	4266	51,8 %	48,2 %
2003	2055	2162	4217	48,7 %	51,3 %
2004	2329	2218	4547	51,2 %	48,8 %
2005	2334	2268	4602	50,7 %	49,3 %
2006	2401	2321	4722	50,8 %	49,2 %
2007	2636	2443	5079	51,9 %	48,1 %
2008	3141	2708	5849	53,7 %	46,3 %
2009	3575	3029	6604	54,1 %	45,9 %
2010	3677	3211	6888	53,4 %	46,6 %
2011	3800	3314	7114	53,4 %	46,6 %
2012	4178	3543	7721	54,1 %	45,9 %
2013	4777	3914	8691	55,0 %	45,0 %

Source: Statistics Norway (SSB), register data.

This table is based on register data from Statistics Norway (SSB). It shows total migrant population in Norway of *Indian* origin, including all categories of migration. We see a stable net rise in the migrant population, from 4,039 in 2000 to 8,691 in 2013.

The distribution between genders appear to be relatively stable, with only a slight increase of three percentage points for men, from 52% to 55%. This is despite the sharp increase in labour-migration over the last decade.

Figure 1. Immigrations by reason for immigration. 1990-2012



Source: Statistics Norway.

The figure is based on register data from Statistics Norway (2013b). We see here the differences in the development of the different categories of migration.

- The number of migrants with a *refugee background* remains relatively stable, with a spike in 1993 attributable to the war in Bosnia and former Yugoslavia and a spike in 1999 attributable to the war in Kosovo, in both cases these conflicts generated waves of refugees entering Norway.
- *Labour migration* sees a sharp increase, especially from 2004 and onwards.
- *Family migration* also sees a more gradual increase throughout the period.

The sharp rise in total migration is largely a product of these latter categories of migration.

2.2.0 Critical discussion of the register data

As shown in Figure 1 above, and as mentioned in the introduction to part 2, there has been a steady increase in total incoming labour migration to Norway since 2004. Figure 1 indicates that the two main components of the increase are (a) an abrupt increase in incoming labour migration, and (b) a steady increase in family migration. As Norwegian policy discourse revolves around welfare state issues, there is much interest in whether those incoming migrants are being integrated into the labour market.

The data in table 4 give an indication regarding labour force participation. For those registered as labour migrants, the percentage of workforce participation is 82% three years after arrival. Family migrants stand at 46%.

However, it might be pointed out that those numbers describe the wage labour market, while family businesses might contribute to growth by investing work that is more informally organized, and, therefore, invisible in the statistics. Official statistics have been assembled to supply the needs of policies that have been formed through compromises between organized capital and labour. *Public*

policy set the research agenda for the accumulation of official register data. *Official register data* inform the further political deliberation that produces new public policies. *This circular relationship* indicates path dependency produced by past political struggles, but with learning capabilities making new policies.

Given the historical influence of organized labour and capital on Norwegian policy, concern for small family businesses, transnational or not, may have had less impact on policy and research agendas. If so, this condition might have similarities with urban marginalization in postcolonial France (Parent 2005). This critical appraisal of the data material is related to our critical assessment of the policy process at the end of part 1. Concern for small family business, transnational or not, is part of the social liberal block within the emerging Conservative coalition government (Christian People's Party, Liberal Left Party), but they have to adjust their claims against the right-wing populist block on the other side of the coalition (Progress Party). The main partner of the coalition conserves the balance (the Conservative Party). This dynamic may or may not lead to policies that are more beneficial for family businesses. If so happens, this would probably also imply that new official statistics will be gathered about fields that now remain under-researched. Therefore, the contentious policy process may or may not co-determine the future direction of discovery, for new register data.

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